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Sale of Securities by "Controlling
Persons" Under the Federal
Securities Act
By HARVEY FRANK*
SECTION 5' of the Securities Act of 19332, herein called the Act,
is ubiquitous. Unless a registration statement is on file with the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission and in effect with respect to a security,
this section prohibits the offer, sale, or delivery of any security by mail
or in interstate commerce. By its terms this prohibition applies, among
other things, to any offer or sale of securities by any security holder
of a corporation,3 whether public or private. Furthermore, the burden
of proof of entitlement to exemption is on the one who would plead it.4
Filing a registration statement is expensive and time consuming.
It may subject the corporation to certain reporting commitments5 and
the directors to certain civil liabilities.' It may also compel the extensive
disclosure of information concerning the corporation, including audited
historical financial statements' which may not be readily available.
If the amount involved is not to exceed $100,000, the filing may be
made pursuant to the exemption provided in section 3(b) of the Act,8
but such a filing is also time consuming and relatively expensive,
compels disclosures and has other possible disadvantages. In any event
the filing cannot be made directly by the selling security holder, but
only by the corporation on his behalf and perhaps at his expense.
These requirements are not to be taken lightly, for any person who
* A.B., LL.M., member of New York bar.
168 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958).
* 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1958).
' Or other issuer, as defined by Securities Act of 1933 § 2 (4), 68 Stat. 683 (1954), 15
U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1958).
'S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Company, 346 U.S. 119 (1953) ; S.E.C. v. Gilligan Will and
Co., 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(d), 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (d)
(1958).
o Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 48 Stat. 907 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958).
7E.g., Securities Act of 1933 Schedule A, 48 Stat. 88, 91 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa
(1958) ; and Form S-1, Instructions as to Financial Statements.
'See, Frank, The Processing of Small Issues of Securities Under Regulation A, 1962
DUKE L.J. 507.
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wilfully violates the Act is subject, upon conviction, to imprisonment
for up to five years9 (although in practice section 5 violations are not
prosecuted unless there is a tinge of fraud). If a sale violates section
5, the buyer has a civil action for rescission against the seller.1" Finally,
a sale by a "controlling person" in violation of section 5 may be en-
joined by a United States district court at the petition of the Securities
and Exchange Commission."
The apparent harshness of the Act is greatly relieved by section 4-12
of the Act which excludes most of the usual transactions of the ordinary
investor from the requirements of section 5. A "controlling person"
cannot so cavalierly avoid section 5, but he may look to section 4 as a
possible exemption for his security sales. Section 4, however, will not
insulate a seller from civil liability under section 12(2) " of the Act
for the offer or sale of a security by the use of false or misleading
statements, for omissions of fact, or for violations of the general prohi-
bitions against fraud in section 17"4 of the Act.
Among the class of private investors, Congress was particularly con-
cerned with sales by "controlling persons":"
All of the outstanding stock of a particular corporation may be
owned by one individual or a select group of individuals. At some fu-
ture date they may wish to dispose of their holdings and to make an
offer of this stock to the public. Such a public offering may possess all
the dangers attendant upon a new offering of securities. Wherever such
a redistribution reaches a significant proportion, the distributor would
be in the position of controlling the issuer and thus able to furnish the
information demanded by the bill. This being so, the distributor is
treated as equivalent to the original issuer and, if he seeks to dispose
of the issue through a public offering, he becomes subject to the Act.
"Control"'" is not defined in the Act. The commission has called it
the possession of the "power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership
of voting securities, by contract or otherwise."1 7 Control may rest with
Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 48 Stat. 87 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1958).
'
0 Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1), 68 Stat. 686 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77(L) (1) (1958).
S.E.C. v. Micro Moisture Controls, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. N.Y. 1598), afJ'd
sub nom. S.E.C. v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959).
"268 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1958).
"68 Stat. 686 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77(1) (2) (1958).
68 Stat. 686 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1958).
H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 14 (1933).
"As used in Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 68 Stat. 683 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11)
(1958).
'- 17 C.F.R. § 230.405. This definition, strictly speaking, applies only to a registration
but it is in context and is a useful guide.
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a group of persons'" and, for the purposes of the Act, each member of
the group may be considered to have control. Among the factors to be
considered are the number of shares held (although a 51% ownership,
of course, is not necessary)," 9 the number of representatives on the
board of directors or as officers, and control of the proxy machinery.
For the purpose of measuring control in the light of the above
quoted Congressional statement, the most useful test, and the one
generally used by the commission in these circumstances, is whether
the selling security holder can cause the corporation to file, at his
expense, a registration statement on his behalf. If he cannot, then he
does not have control for these purposes and he should be treated as
an ordinary investor.
If a controlling security holder sells his voting stock interest over
a period of time there may come a point in the distribution when he
is no longer a "controlling person." However, if the securities sold
after control has passed are part of the same issue as those which were
sold before control passed, then the seller would presumably bo re-
garded as a "control person" until distribution of the entire issue was
completed.2 °
The First Clause Exemption
Direct Sales
Section 5 does not, by the terms of the first clause of section 4(1)
of the Act, apply to "transactions by any person other than an issuer,
underwriter or dealer."'" By definition" the usual transaction of an
investor has been placed beyond the registration requirements of the
Act. No security holder, not even a "controlling person," falls within
these categories.
"Underwriter" is defined in section 2(11) as:
[A]ny person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or
offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any
security .... As used in this paragraph the term "issuer" shall include,
in addition to an issuer, any person directly or indirectly controlling or
" See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1933).
" Id. at 14; Thompson Ross Securities Co., 6 S.E.C. 1111 (1940).
"°An "insider," whether or not he is a control person, may also have a fiduciary
obligation toward a purchaser under state law, and if the corporation is listed on a national
securities exchange such an insider would be subject to the liability for short swing profits
imposed by section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 78p (1958); cf. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (implied liabilities under Rule lOb-5 of this
statute).
" Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1) (1958).
"Securities Act of 1933 §§2(4), (11), (12), 68 Stat. 683 (1954), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(4),
(11), (12) (1958).
controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common
control with the issuer.
Thus an underwriter, even a statutory underwriter (one by definition
rather than by profession), cannot claim the protection of the first
clause of section 4(1) where there is a purchase from a "controlling
person." Purchasers should therefore take measures to avoid being
considered statutory underwriters. But what about the selling, "con-
trolling," security holder? Shall the father go unfettered if we condemn
the unwed mother for her issue?
The answer is "no." If a purchaser from a "controlling person'
is deemed to be a statutory underwriter then the first clause exemption
is lost to the "controlling person" as well. That is clearly established.
But since this does not accord with a literal reading of the statute,
how do we get there from here? For the most part the result has simply
been assumed 23 and it is certainly consistent with the Congressional
scheme.
Perhaps the cleanest approach is to consider the selling "controlling
person" as an aider and abettor 4 under the criminal code. 25 A second
approach is to face it out as a matter of statutory interpretation. Even
if the "controlling person" is not an "issuer, underwriter or dealer,"
he is participating in a transaction with an underwriter and the first
clause of section 4(1) does not apply to the component parts of the
transaction. The exemption does not by "fair implication" protect those
engaged in steps necessary to the distribution of a security issue.26
The limiting factor for the "controlling person," then, is whether
his sale or the subsequent resale by the purchaser (or related series of
sales and resales) is a "distribution" within the meaning of section
2(11) of the Act.
A selling "controlling person" can protect himself by taking pre-
cautions against such sales and resales constituting a public offering.
If he does so he can be certain that a purchaser from him will not be
deemed to be a statutory underwriter. That is, he should obtain an
investment representation from his purchasers, limit the number of
offerees, make financial and other related information about the cor-
poration available to the offerees, exclude brokerage firms from the
offerees, and so forth.
' See Skiatron Electronics and Television Corp., Securities Act Release No. 4282
(Oct. 3, 1960).
2 4 S.E.C. v. Micro Moisture Controls, 167 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. N.Y. 1958), aff'd sub
nom. S.E.C. v. Culpepper, 270 F. 2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959).
"65 Stat. 717 (1951), 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
20 Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 120 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618, (1941). See S.E.C. v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959).
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A selling stockholder will find it more difficult than an issuer to
separate several offerings into distinct issues. However, as we shall see
shortly, a "distribution" within the meaning of section 2(11) may be
broader than the second clause of the section 4(1) concept of public
offering.
Sales Through Brokers
There are no special provisions governing sales by a "controlling
person" through a dealer except when the sales are "brokers' trans-
actions" as defined in rule 15427 and section 4(2) of the Act."8 In such
a case the "controlling person" will be an incidental beneficiary of
the only reasonably certain standards in section 4 of the Act.
Section 4(2) of the Act was drafted to exempt ordinary brokers'
transactions.29 The section exempts only the broker and not the selling
customer."0 A selling security holder (whether or not he is a "controlling
person") may avail himself of the exemption of the first clause of
section 4(1). Both the broker and the "controlling person" will lose
their respective exemptions if the broker is acting as an underwriter.
Rule 154 concerns only transactions for the account of a "controlling
person." Since a private person is never an "issuer," except within the
meaning of section 2(11), the broker cannot then be a statutory under-
writer. Because a corporation is an issuer and has no exemption for its
side of the transaction if there is a public offering (which a sale through
a broker almost invariably includes), there was no need for the rule
to be occupied with such transactions.
" Rule 154 defines a "brokers' transaction" in section 4(2) to include transactions of
sale executed by a broker for the account of any controlling person where (1) the broker
performs no more than the usual and customary broker's function, (2) receives no more
than the usual and customary commission, (3) neither he, nor to his knowledge his princi-
pal, solicits orders to buy, and (4) he is not aware of circumstances indicating that his
principal is an underwriter or engaged in the distribution of securities.
For the purpose of this rule "distribution" shall not apply to "transactions involving
an amount not substantial in relation to the number of shares of units of the security
outstanding and the volume of trading in the security." This includes all sales by a person
of a class of securities within six months not exceeding approximately (1) 1% of such
outstanding securities or (2) if listed on an exchange the lesser of (1) and the largest
aggregate volume of trading during any one of the preceding four weeks. Rule 154, 17
C.F.R. 230.154.
Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2) (1958):
"Section 5 shall not apply to brokers' transactions."
"H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1933).
30 See Skiatron Electronics and Television Corp., Securities Act Release No. 4282 (Oct.
3, 1960).
As the Commission noted in Ira Haupt and Co.:31
Just as an "underwriter" acting as such cannot be encompassed by
the term "dealer" as used in the third clause of Sec. 4(1), he is similarly
not within the scope of the term broker as used in Sec. 4(2)32-i.e., the
fact that a person is an "underwriter" acting as such is conclusive in in-
dicating that he cannot at the same time be considered as a dealer or
broker under Sec. 4(1) or 4(2).
The Commission subsequently promulgated rule 15433 as an "aid
in determining when transactions by brokers are routine trading trans-
actions within the brokers' exemption of section 4(2) and when such
transactions may be part of a distribution of securities by the brokers'
principal and not exempt as 'brokers' transactions' " 34-that is, when
the broker is acting as an underwriter rather than as a dealer. This is
the so called "1o Rule." In general, it will not, for the purpose of
defining a "brokers' transaction" in section 4(2), treat as a "distribu-
tion" a sale by a "controlling person" which does not exceed, during
a six month period, 1% of the outstanding securities of the class of
security sold. It is understood that the Commission considers the 1%
figure to be available for each "controlling person" (unless they act in
concert, or perhaps if they are part of the same family or other closely
intertwined group) ; but such sales include all unregistered (and pos-
sibly registered) sales of the "controlling person" during the six month
period regardless of whether an exemption was available. Moreover,
the rule will not necessarily be applicable to 11o distributions in
successive six month periods which, when viewed together, appear to
represent a concerted effort at a distribution.
Beside furnishing the "controlling person" a broker who will
reasonably hazard a brokerage sale for him, rule 154 also defines.
under the rationale of the Ira Haupt decision, the term "underwriter"
in the first clause of section 4(1) of the Act for the purpose of a trans-
action coming within the provisions of rule 154. If a dealer is not an
underwriter for the purposes of section 4(2), he would not in the
same transaction be an underwriter for the purpose of section 4(1),
and the "controlling person" would consequently be exempt. The same
reasoning which made the exemption of the first clause of section 4(1)
23 S.E.C. 589, 604 n. 23 (1946).
"The provisions of Section 5 do not apply to . . . transactions by a dealer (including
an underwriter no longer acting as an underwriter in respect of the securities involved in
such transaction) ... " Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(1) (1958).
" Securities Act Release No. 3525 (Dec. 22, 1954).
" Skiatron Electronics and Television Corp., Securities Act Release No. 4282 (Oct.
3,1960).
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unavailable to a "controlling person" when it was unavailable to his
statutory underwriter cannot withhold it from the "controlling person"
when his purchaser or agent is acting permissively. We have not ex-
plored what constitutes allowable brokerage activity, but suffice it to
say that it is sufficiently complex for a prudent "controlling person" to
advise his broker that he is such whenever he sells in that capacity.
Regardless of whether a broker for a "controlling seller" is a statu-
tory underwriter, if such a "controlling seller" is a statutory underwriter
because he has violated an investment representation, the exemption
of the first clause of section 4(1) is not available to him. Rule 154
will not terminate an investment commitment.
Finally, if a broker is aware, or reasonably should be aware, 5 that
his principal is an underwriter with respect to the securities, then he
will be a statutory underwriter and the first clause exemption will not
be available to the selling "controlling person."
Pledges
There is no specific exemption in the Act for a pledge or a fore-
closure sale of pledged securities. Is a bona fide pledge, then, normally
made with a view towards a public offering or a distribution? Pre-
sumably not. A bank, or other institutional lender, is in the business
of lending money and not that of selling securities. At least it seems
to be a question of fact which should await the event of foreclosure
for determination. Until that time the pledgor will have the option of
discharging the loan or substituting collateral.
The foreclosure sale is something else again. If the bank or other
pledgee of the securities of a "controlling person" is deemed to be a
person who has "purchased with a view to" distribution or "offers or
sells for" a "controlling person" in connection with a distribution within
the meaning of section 2(11), such pledgee will be a statutory under-
writer. A pledge is a disposition for value36 and hence "purchased," as
used in section 2 (11) ; purchased, though not defined in the Act, has been
interpreted as complementary to "sale."3 If, then, the foreclosure sale
constitutes a distribution, the pledgee will be a statutory underwriter and
the "controlling person" cannot avail himself of the exemption of the
first clause of section 4(1).
" Securities Act Release No. 3525 (Dec. 22, 1954); cf., Securities Act Release No.
4445 (Feb. 2, 1962).
"O S.E.C. v. Guild Films Company, Inc., 279 F. 2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied sub
nom, Santa Monica Bank v. S.E.C., 364 U.S. 819 (1960).
37 Ibid.
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"A sale by the pledgee is, of course, pursuant to a power of sale
granted by the owner; and such a pledge may often operate in practical
effect as a 'stop loss' order-an order to a broker to sell if the market
value of the securities drops below a specific price."3 One exercising
the prerequisites and receiving the benefits of ownership should not so
easily avoid the requirements of registration by the form chosen for
the particular transaction." Nor does the good faith of the pledgee
place the transaction beyond the definition of a statutory underwriter
when it is engaged in steps necessary to a public sale. The statute does
not impose such a criterion. To a purchaser, it is not a substitute for
the information he is entitled to under the Act.4"
The Second Clause Exemption
Probably the most common way for a "controlling person"41 to
obtain his interest in a corporation is in a transaction "by an issuer not
involving a public offering," because this exempts the issuer from the
provisions of section 5, pursuant to the second clause of section 4(1).42
This is particularly true of securities obtained during the formative
stages of a corporation. By accepting unregistered securities in reliance
on the exemption of the second clause of section 4(1) of the Act, a
security holder commits himself to certain restrictions as to their subse-
quent sale. That is, the exemption is founded on the fact that he is
taking these securities for investment. For if he purchases the securities
with a view towards distribution, or a public offering, the issuer's
exemption will be lost. The exemption of the first clause of section
4(1) will not be available to the purchaser, in the first instance, because
he would himself be a statutory underwriter and, in the second instance,
because he would be participating in an illegal sale with an issuer
(under the same rationale which deprives a "controlling person" of
the exemption of the first clause of section 4(1) when his purchaser is
a statutory underwriter).
The determination of what constitutes a public offering is essentially
a question of fact.43 The Supreme Court, in S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina
"Surface Transit, Inc. v. Saxe, Bacon and O'Shea. 266 F.2d 862, 867 (2d Cir. 1959).
" Cf., ibid.
" S.E.C. v. Guild Films Company, Inc., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Skiatron Elec-
tronics and Television Corp., Securities Act Release No. 24282 (Oct. 3, 1960). In both
eases, however, the pledges were in fact not bona fide.
" This discussion is also applicable to noncontrolling security-holders who purchase
from an issuer for investment.
"Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 68 Stat. 684 (1954), 15 U.S.C. §77d(1) (1958).
"Opinion of General Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
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Co.,4" would not, as a matter of statutory interpretation, draw a numeri-
cal limit on private offerings but said that the statute would "apply to
a 'public offering' whether to few or to many." '45 The Court seemed
more concerned with the need for protection of the particular class of
persons affected: "The focus of the inquiry should be on the need of
the offerees ... to have access to the kind of information which regis-
tration would disclose.
' 46
The number of offerees and their relationship to each other and to
the issuer, rather than the number of purchasers, is the basic factor.47
In an early opinion the general counsel stated that "under ordinary
circumstances an offering to not more than 25 persons ... presumably
does not involve a public offering.... [But] in no sense is the question
to be determined exclusively by the number of prospective offerees."
48
This generalization is probably still a fair reflection of the commission's
view.
4 9
Further, it is the number of ultimate offerees that counts.3 There-
fore, it is important to be sure that the offering comes to rest with the
original purchasers or soon after, or, in other words, that they acquire
the securities for investment. 1 This is governed by the intention of the
purchaser at the time of his purchase but it is measured by external
facts.5" This is the purpose, for example, of the investment letter-a
self-serving, contemporaneous representation by the purchaser which is
commonly requested by the issuer. It is evidentiary, but not conclusive. 3
Again, if a stop transfer order is, with the purchaser's consent, placed
simultaneously with the transfer agent and an appropriate restrictive
legend is placed on the face of the certificate to make the stop order
effective under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, there is a further
reflection of a genuine investment intent. These steps will also help
"346 U.S. 119 (1953).
"Id. at 125.
"Id. at 127.
"Opinion of General Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935) ; Securi-
ties Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
"Opinion of General Counsel, supra note 47.
"See WHEN CORPORATIONS Go Punic 15-16 (Israels and Duff, ed., 1962) (statement
of Mr. Shreve).
'0 Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957);
see Gilligan Will and Co. v. S.E.C., 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
1 bid. See, IsRAELS AND DuFF, op cit supra, note No. 49, at 17-19 (Statement of ir.
Shreve).
" Cf., Opinion of General Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 1862 (Dec. 14, 1938).
" Ibid. Cf., Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12,
1957) ; Gilligan Will and Co. v. S.E.C., 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
the issuer to retain effective control over the scope of the offering.54
Most prominent among the relevant and objective evidentiary factors
is the length of time which elapses between the acquisition of the secu-
rities and the proposed resale. 5  The present administrative view seems
to be that retention for a period of from one56 to twoZ years is fair
evidence of an investment intent. A change in the personal circumstances
of the purchaser would permit an earlier sale without casting doubt on
the genuineness of the original investment intent, but not a change in
the financial situation of the issuer.5
Other factors which tend to make an offering appear public are
the presence of broker-dealer firms among the original purchasers,59
use of a bearer form of security,6 issuance of several smaller denomi-
nation certificates to a purchaser instead of a single one of larger
denomination, 6 the size of the offering6 2 and the speculative nature of
the security.63 The size of the offering, the number of offerees and other
related factors refer separately to each integrated issue of securities.
If an alleged investment purchaser has in fact acquired his securities
with a view to distribution (which may not be quite the same as an
intent to make a public offering) he will be deemed a statutory under-
writer, and the exemption of the first clause of section 4(1) will not
be available to him for the resale of his own securities. An investor
may normally resell to another, for investment purposes only, without
violating his own investment representation although the aggregate
number of offerees for the issue of securities will be increased by the
number of such purchasers.
The criteria which distinguish a private from a public offering will
also describe the apogee beneath which a transaction or series of trans-
actions is not a distribution, whatever may lie in the stratosphere
beyond.
Distribution-Distinguishing the First and Second Clause
We have seen that a "controlling person" can be assured that a
sale by him of the securities of his controlled corporation will not
"Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
"Cf., Opinion of General Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 1862 (Dec. 14, 1938).
Ibid.
See, U.S. v. Shenvood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
s Gilligan Will and Co. v. S.E.C., 267 F. 2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957)
Opinion of General Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 1862 (Dec. 14, 1938).
'0 Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
" Opinion of General Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
1
2 Ibid.
3 Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
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be a "distribution" if he takes care to see that it is not a public offering.
Although not expressly defined in the Act, the Commission has defined
"distribution" as "the entire process by which in the course of a public
offering a block of securities is dispersed and ultimately comes to rest
in the hands of the investing public."64 (Emphasis added.) Thus, unless
there is a public offering, there is no distribution. But, are the words
synonymous or does the term "distribution" give a broader scope to
the exemption of a "controlling person" under the first clause of section
4(1) than "public offering" gives to the issuer under the second clause
of section 4(1) ?
When the Commission defined "distribution" it significantly used
the term "block." Congress, in describing a distribution which would
subject a "controlling person" to the registration requirements of the
Act, used the term "significant proportions."65 Also, Congress did not
add "controlling person" to the category of "issuer, underwriter or
dealer" in the first clause of section 4(1) nor did it use that term in refer-
ring to an "issuer" in the second clause of that section. Since Congress
avoided this obvious, direct approach it is reasonable, therefore, to
suppose that a deliberate distinction was intended between the exemption
in section 4(1), available to an issuer, and that which is available to a
"controlling person."
Almost the entire thrust of section 2(11)," in which "distribution"
is used to define an "underwriter," is directed toward describing a
professional underwriter; i.e., one who is selling, or is in the business
of selling, substantial or at least significant quantities of securities.
There is no implication that a private investor may not be, as we have
considered him before, a statutory underwriter. That is surely the law.
Rather, can we distinguish, at least, between the offer of one share of
treasury stock by a corporate issuer on an exchange (a public offer-
ing) ,7 which offer deprives the issuer of the exemption of the second
clause of section 4(1) of the act, and a similar offer (or sale) by a
"controlling person"?
", Oklahoma-Texas Trust, 2 S.E.C. 764, 769 (1937), aJ'd sub nom; accord, Oklahoma-
Texas Trust v. S.E.C., 100 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1939); Lewisohn Copper Corp., 38 S.E.C.
226 (1958) ; Ira Haupt and Co., 23 S.E.C. 589, 597 (1946).
" H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1933).
" "The term 'underwriter' means any person who has purchased from an issuer with a
view to or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with the distribution of any security,
or participates . . . in any such undertaking, but such term shall not include a person
whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter not in excess of the usual
and customary distributors' or sellers' commission." Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 68
Stat. 683 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (11) (1958).
"' Wilko v. Swann, 127 F. Supp. 55 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
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The Commission's definition of "distribution" contemplates a sale,
and perhaps a resale, of a block of securities. A public offering by an
issuer does not require any sale to remove it from the exemption of
the second clause of section 4(1). Moreover, one who purchases from a
"controlling person" with a view to distribution, but who has not yet
formulated his plan of distribution or does not intend an immediate
resale, may not file a registration statement because it would be a
registration for the shelf.6" This is not illegal, for the statutory pattern
does not contemplate making an act criminal before that compliance
which it contemplates can be consummated. On the other hand, if the
purchasers from an issuer in an allegedly private offering do not take
for investment, then there can be an immediate violation of section 5.
In justifying the application of the registration provisions of the
Act to a controlling person, the Commission in the Ira Haupt case
said :69
These sections [2(11) and 4(1) ] by their terms provide that when-
ever anyone controlling an issuer makes a public distribution of his
holdings in the controlled corporation by selling through another per-
son acting for him in connection with the distribution, the sales by
which the distribution is accomplished are transactions by an under-
writer which are subject to the registration requirements. Applied to
such transactions by which substantial quantities of securities are dis-
posed of to the public, the registration requirement is consistent with
and calculated to further the general purpose of the Act to provide in-
vestors with pertinent information as a means of self protection. The
legislative history of the Act strongly sustains this conclusion. [Em-
phasis added.]
Rule 154 would be absurd if "distribution" were equated with
"public offering," because the public offering of even an inconsequen-
tial number of securities would turn the broker into a statutory under-
writer and deprive him of the section 4(2) exemption. The broker
would not need a routine guide to determine whether his principal was
engaged in a distribution, but he need only know whether his principal
was a controlling person. So when the commission came to define
"distribution" for the purpose of rule 154 it defined it as "an amount
not substantial in relation to the number of shares of the security or
units of the security outstanding and the aggregate volume of trading
in such security" 7o-that is, securities not offerees.
Thus it appears that a distribution is concerned with a sale of
securities by means of a public offering. How many securities must be
" Securities Act of 1933 § 6(a) 48 Stat. 78 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1958).
6 23 S.E.C. at 601.
70 17 C.F.R. 230.154(b) (Emphasis added).
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sold to constitute a distribution? Presumably this will be computed by
the size of the issue and not the actual number of securities sold, pro-
vided that some securities are sold. The number of offerees is critical
only to the determination of whether the distribution is in the course
of a public offering. In other words, the "controlling person" of our
illustration can sell his one share of stock (if that is the size of his
issue) on an exchange pursuant to the exemption of the first clause of
section 4(1). The next question is how many additional securities can
he sell?
If the broker and "controlling person" comply with the provisions
of rule 154 then the answer can be found in the "1% Rule." We have
come full circle. But what if the broker does not comply with all the
particulars of rule 154? Or what if the sale is not made through a
broker? Rule 154 and its definitions apply, by its terms, only to section
4(2). Caution must surround any attempt to reason inductively from
rule 154. There are particular restrictions on the broker which are
designed to prevent solicitation or other sales activity and to prevent
such a dealer from acting, or appearing to act, as a professional under-
writer. A broker has a special problem in that he cannot stop to obtain
a legal opinion for every transaction executed at the peril of losing his
license. When acting innocently, he needs the insulating certainty of
a fixed rule.
Although attended with some risk in circumstances that fall outside
the boundaries of rule 154, a broker could sell publicly on behalf
of a "controlling person" without being deemed an underwriter and
thus find the section 4(2) exemption still available. Rule 154 is
not exclusive. In such circumstances, the broker must rely on such
general principles of "distribution" as were enumerated above; and he
might well look for a guide to those principles which were apparently
used in forging rule 154 and which have been mentioned.
A sale by a "controlling person" to private purchasers should be
less of a "distribution" than a sale to, or through, brokers."l That being
so, an unsolicited sale by a "controlling person" (which otherwise
meets the requirements of rule 154 as far as it can be applicable) to
a private purchaser should not be a "distribution" if a similar sale in a
brokerage transaction would not be a distribution. While a broker could
possibly be deemed an underwriter in circumstances where a -private
person might not, the reverse would indeed be strange. Analogies based
on the 1% Rule should not range too far; but neither should they be
7 Cf., Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957);
Opinion of General Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 1862 (Dec. 14, 1938).
completely dismissed. The logic of the rule that a " 'distribution' shall
not apply to transactions involving an amount not substantial to the
number of shares or units of the security outstanding and the aggregate
volume of trading in such security ' 7 2 should still be pertinent.
This is what the Commission seems to say; but it has not yet said
it explicitly. There are no sure guidelines. Once a "controlling person"
walks beyond the protection of a non-public offering he must be very
cautious.
Non Jurisdictional Sales
Section 5 applies only where a means of communication or instru-
ment of transportation involving interstate commerce is used, or the
mails are used, to offer, sell or deliver a security. Interstate commerce is
defined by section 2(7)7" of the Act as "trade or commerce in securities
or any transportation or communication relating thereto among the sev-
eral states . . . or between any foreign country and any state ... .
Thus, where either party crosses a state line to effectuate the transaction,
sends a related communication by telephone, telegraph or otherwise,
delivers any security of the issue across a state line or makes any use of
the mails, the jurisdictional requirement is met and section 5 and the
entire act will be applicable. All of this is well establish. The remaining
area of inquiry is what interstate acts may precede or follow an offer
without being so much a part of it as to confer jurisdiction? Is payment
by mail such a constituent part of the sale that it will confer jurisdiction?
Is an interstate telephone call a communication in interstate commerce?
Finally, if the security sold is part of a larger interstate issue then will
the intrastate transaction be integrated with the entire issue and thus
confer jurisdiction?
What Is An Issue?
If portions of a distribution could be segregated into a series of
several smaller, separate offerings and sales so that a separate exemp-
tion would apply to each segment although it would not apply to the
whole, then the registration requirements of the Act could be too
readily avoided by accumulating exemptions."4 The Commission's solu-
72 17 C.F.R. 230.154(b).
13 68 Stat. 683 (1954), 15 U.S.C. § 77b (7) (1958). The question of jurisdiction is one
of the most litigated aspects of the Act and this discussion is only intended as a general
summary. Except in the atypical situation where the transaction is clearly and exclusively
intrastate, the selling "controlling person" would better rely on one of the exemptions in
Section 4 of the Act, which is the main thrust of this article.
'4 Herbert R. May, 27 S.E.C. 814 (1948).
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tion has been to integrate related offerings or sales. It is now well
established that an exemption is valid only if it is available for the
entire issue.7
When, then, is a series of transactions sufficiently related so that
it can be integrated into a single issue for the purpose of determining
the availability of the section 4(1) exemptions? Clearly, "when secu-
rities of the same class are offered for an identical purpose and on the
same terms in an uninterrupted program of distribution."76 Other
considerations include the terms of sale and methods of distribution
employed, and the purposes for which the proceeds are used.77 As
should be expected, each case must be determind on its own facts."8
Conclusion
The Act's restrictions on the sale of securities of a controlled
corporation by a "controlling person" are at once greater than those
which affect a "non-controlling" person and less than those which affect
a corporation. Whether the securities to be sold were registered in the
past is immaterial. If a transaction is not exempt, registration of the
securities must be effective with respect to it.
When a "controlling person" acquires his securities for investment,
pursuant to the exemption of the second clause of section 4(1) of the
Act, he is bound, basically, by the same restrictions as is an issuer.
Whether the offering is a public one will be a factual determination.
The critical facts relating to offerees include their ultimate number,
their relationship to each other and to the company, their need for infor-
mation, and whether they include brokers, institutional investors or
private persons.
At first glance, a "controlling person" might appear to be entitled
to sell his securities in the same manner as a "non-controlling person"
under the exemption of the first clause of section 4(1) of the Act.
However, because of the definitions in section 2(11) such an exemption
will not be available to him unless the securities were purchased for
some purpose other than distribution.
The meaning of "distribution" is uncertain. It encompasses "public
offering" and it also appears to involve the size of the offering; i.e., the
number of securities sold or to be sold as part of an issue in a given
7Ibid.; Unity Gold, 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938); Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., Securities
Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957) ; Opinion of General Counsel, Securities Act Release
No. 2029 (Aug. 8, 1939).
7' Herbert R. May, 27 S.E.C. 814, 819 (1948).
77 Unity Gold, 3 S.E.C. 618, 625 (1938).
71 Ibid.
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circumstance. Except where the securities are to be sold in a brokers'
transaction which complies with the provisions of rule 154, the guide-
posts are obscure.
There is a pattern to the Act, but the borders and many of the details
are obscure. Some vagueness may be inevitable. Yet after thirty years
there is still considerably more uncertainty than one would desire. This
is a problem to which the eighty-eighth Congress might well turn its
attention as it reviews the report of the Commission's Special Study of
Securities Markets.
